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What is important?
? easy to understand
? easy to implement
? fair (¿?)
? consistent  under renegotiation
We look for cost-sharing rules:
The game theory model
? Game theory gives tools and define 
solutions to allocate the total cost of 
serving the members of a group 
demanding a common service
? It takes into account the cost of serving a 
subgroup S of members
N:set of members;   CN: total cost
C(S): cost of serving a subgroup S
Giving solutions:
? The core (Gillies, 1953)
? The constrained equal cost
? The constrained equal savings
? The talmudic rule (the Talmud is a vast 
collection of Jewish laws and traditions)
Giving solutions and their properties:
The Core
An allocation of the total cost CN is a 
vector y=(y1, y2,... yn) such that 
∑Syi=CN
A cost allocation y is in the core if no 
subgroup S is charged more than its 
stand-alone cost
C(S)≥∑Syi,    for all S
Giving solutions and their properties:
The Core
If only information about individual stand-
alone cost (ci) is available, then
C(S)=min [CN,∑Sci]
Then, an allocation (y1,…,yn) of the cost is in 
the core if  ∑Nyi=CN and 0 ≤ yi ≤ ci
Example:  (c1, c2, c3, c4)=(8,4,6,8) and CN=10
y1+ y2+ y3+ y4=10 and 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 8 , 0 ≤ y2 ≤6, 
0 ≤ y3 ≤ 4, 0 ≤ y2 ≤ 2
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Giving solutions and their properties:
The constrained equal cost
Agents share equally the cost under the condition that 
nobody is charged more than his stand-alone cost
c1=8 c2= 6 c3= 4 c4= 2
C=12
C=2c2= 6
C=6
Giving solutions and their properties:
The Constrained equal savings
Agents get equal savings provided all agents end 
with a  positive cost-share
C=20
c1= 8
c3= 4
c4= 2
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Giving solutions and their properties:
The talmudic rule
Apply the CEC rule to half of the total cost and the 
CES rule to the other half
8 6 4 2
Giving solutions and their properties:
Comparing properties
(Herrero & Villar, 2001)
Comp. from 
separable cost
Self-duality
Consistency
Composition
Equal 
Treatment
Propor.Talmud.CESCEC
Prop
Rules
An example: the CBUC case
Downloads Stand alone CEC TL CES Prop
UOC 3667 18335 7210 15318,75 16113,13 12665,21
UB 2618 13090 7210 10073,75 10868,13 9042,14
UPC 1853 9265 7210 6248,75 7043,13 6399,95
UAB 1659 8295 7210 5278,75 6073,13 5729,91
UJI 958 4790 4790 2395 2568,13 3308,77
URV 750 3750 3750 1875 1528,13 2590,38
UPF 572 2860 2860 1430 638,13 1975,59
UDG 478 2390 2390 1195 168,13 1650,93
UDL 391 1955 1955 977,5 0,00 1350,45
UVIC 83 415 415 207,5 0,00 286,67
13029 65145 45000 45000 45000 45000,00
MCB-Emerald (2001)
Remark: suppose each download is worth 5 €
and the total cost I 45.000 €
d 5·d
Final remarks
? Other game theory solutions
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953)
The nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969)
The τ-value (Tijs, 1981)
